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NOTES
Uniform Probate Code Section 2-202: A Proposal to Include
Life Insurance Assets Within the Augmented Estate
In 1970 the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws published
the Uniform Probate Code (the "U.P.C."). The U.P.C. entitles a
surviving spouse to take a one-third share of the decedent's aug-
mented estate whether the deceased spouse dies testate or
intestate.'
The Commissioners developed the augmented estate concept
to calculate the assets subject to the surviving spouse's forced share.
The Commissioners include in the augmented estate the value of
certain lifetime transfers of property by the decedent during mar-
riage to donees other than the surviving spouse. 2 The comment to
1 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-202 (1982). Section 2-201 states in part: "If a married
person ... dies, the surviving spouse has a right of election to take an elective share of
one-third of the augmented estate under the limitations and conditions hereinafter
stated."
2 Id. § 2-202(1). Section 2-202(1) states in full:
The augmented estate means the estate reduced by funeral and ad-
ministration expenses, homestead allowance, family allowances and ex-
emptions, and enforceable claims, to which is added the sum of the
following amounts:
(1) The value of property transferred to anyone other than a bona fide
purchaser by the decedent at any time during marriage, to or for the ben-
efit of any person other than the surviving spouse, to the extent that the
decedent did not receive adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth for the transfer, if the transfer is of any of the following
types:
(i) any transfer under which the decedent retained at the time of his
death the possession or enjoyment of, or right to income from, the
property;
(ii) any transfer to the extent that the decedent retained at the time of
his death a power, either alone or in conjunction with any other person,
to revoke or to consume, invade or dispose of the principal for his own
benefit;
(iii) any transfer whereby property is held at the time of decedent's
death by decedent and another with right of survivorship;
(iv) any transfer made to a donee within two years of death of the dece-
dent to the extent that the aggregate transfers to any one donee in either
of the years exceed $3,000.00.
Any transfer is excluded if made with the written consent orjoinder
of the surviving spouse. Property is valued as of the decedent's death
except that property given irrevocably to a donee during lifetime of the
decedent is valued as of the date the donee came into possession or en-
joyment if that occurs first. Nothing herein shall cause to be included in
the augmented estate any life insurance, accident insurance, joint annu-
ity, or pension payable to a person other than the surviving spouse.
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U.P.C. section 2-202 explicitly states that the addition of these life-
time transfers to the augmented estate supports the policy of
preventing the decedent from deliberately disinheriting the surviv-
ing spouse. 3 Although this policy restricts freedom of testation, it
reflects a long history of protecting the surviving spouse from com-
plete disinheritance. 4
U.P.C. section 2-202 places a limit on the augmented estate by
excluding life insurance. 5 Given the current popularity of life insur-
ance as an estate planning device, 6 this exclusion allows a decedent
effectively to disinherit the surviving spouse. 7 Because the aug-
mented estate forecloses other lifetime transfers used in the past to
disinherit the surviving spouse, 8 this loophole may prove increas-
ingly significant in the future.9
Part I of this Note traces the various methods courts and legisla-
tures have used to protect the surviving spouse from disinheritance.
Part II analyzes the importance of life insurance as a transmittor of
wealth by comparing the functions of life insurance and other will
substitutes with the functions of wills, and discusses the implications
for disinheritance of the surviving spouse. Part III proposes a
formula to eliminate the life insurance limitation in the augmented
estate which would not expose insurance companies to liability for
wrongly paying out life insurance proceeds to named beneficiaries,
or threaten them with unduly high costs. Finally, this Note con-
cludes that legislatures and courts should acknowledge the similar
functions played by life insurance and wills in estate planning, and
treat life insurance assets as probate assets by including them in the
augmented estate.
3 Id. section 2-202 commentary at 39 (1982). The comment states that one reason
for adding the lifetime transfers specified in section 2-202(l) is "to prevent the owner of
wealth from making arrangements which transmit his property to others by means other
than probate deliberately to defeat the right of the surviving spouse to a share . "
4 See Haskins, The Development of Common Law Dower, 62 HARV. L. REV. 42 (1948).
5 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-202(1) (1982).
6 See infra notes 114-21 and accompanying text. See also Langbein, The Nonprobate
Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108 (1984). (Pointing
out the prominence of will substitutes, such as life insurance, in estate planning, and
criticizing courts for treating them differently from wills.)
7 See W. MACDONALD, FRAUD ON THE WIDOW'S SHARE 236-42 (1960) (Noting that
although life insurance is generally regarded as an estate enhancer, it can function to
evade the surviving spouse's forced share.).
8 Kurtz, The Augmented Estate Concept Under the Uniform Probate Code: In Search of an
Equitable Elective Share, 62 IOWA L. REV. 981, 1027 (1977). Professor Kurtz points out
that the U.P.C. reaches common disinheritance devices such as revocable trusts and Tot-
ten trusts.
) See id. at 1035.
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I
PROTECTION OF THE SURVIVING SPOUSE FROM
DISINHERITANCE
A. Dower
The premise behind the U.P.C. augmented estate concept-
that the laws should not allow decedents to disinherit surviving
spouses-traces its history to the common law concept of "dower."
"Dower" is a French word, but the idea's origins date to German
law which prevailed in England before the Norman Conquest.' 0
Originally, dower meant the right of a wife to remain in her hus-
band's house, specifically, a "right to a seat by the hearth.""I Dur-
ing the Anglo-Saxon period in England, from the fifth to the tenth
century, dower became a more specific right of the widow to a share
of the deceased husband's property. ' 2 If the husband had not made
a specific dower gift, the law gave his widow an absolute share, gen-
erally one-third in an undivided portion of her husband's real
property. 13
Under the prevailing form of twelfth century dower, at marriage
a husband gave his wife a life estate in particular land should she
survive him.' 4 During the period following the Conquest, land was
the principal source of wealth for most families.' 5 Because dower
was land-based, it provided a widow with some economic security,
and it afforded support for younger children who had no inheri-
tance rights by the laws of primogeniture.' 6 Although the bride-
groom could specifj which lands would form the dower, he could
not marry without having named a dower.' 7
By the thirteenth century, a wife's right to dower had become
important enough to be included in the Magna Carta.' 8 By the end
of the thirteenth century, if a man did not name a specific dower, the
10 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.2, at 618 (AJ. CASNER ed. 1952) [hereinafter
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY]. Casner observes that dower seems to have been derived
from early German law where a bridegroom paid his bride's family a fee. The fee served
two purposes. First, it was a payment by the bridegroom to acquire rights over the
bride. Second, the payment was a mourning gift for the wife to use if her husband
predeceased her.
'' Id.
12 See id. at 619.
13 Id.
14 Id. The widow lost the life estate in her husband's land when she remarried.
15 Id. § 5.3, at 622.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 W. McKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA 215 (2d ed. 1914). Chapter 7 of the Magna Carta
provides:
A widow after the death of her husband, shall forthwith and without diffi-
culty have her marriage portion and inheritance; nor shall she give any-
thing for her dower, or for her marriage portion, or for the inheritance
1989] 513
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law entitled his surviving widow to one-third of the lands of which
he had been seised at any time during his marriage. 19 Named dower
fell into disuse by the fifteenth century, and unnamed dower by op-
eration of law became the prevalent form of dower. 20 Under un-
named dower, a husband could not bar his wife's interest in land 2'
which he owned during their marriage by a lifetime conveyance, un-
less his wife consented. The husband's inability to convey land
unencumbered by the dower interest made it difficult to alienate
land at its fair value because potential buyers feared the land would
later be subject to a widow's dower interest.22 Although concep-
tually dower conflicts with primogeniture, 23 the free alienability of
land, and land-based feudal power,24 by the fifteenth century it had
become a durable part of the common law in England. 25
While states in the United States initially adopted the essential
features of the English concept of dower,26 most states subse-
quently have abolished or limited dower.27 Several reasons explain
which her husband and she held on the day of the death of that
husband ....
19 Haskins, supra note 4, at 52.
20 Id. at 54.
21 While both spouses were alive the wife's right remained inchoate-that is, her
right did not become possessory until she survived her husband. Kurtz, supra note 8, at
985.
22 Dower also cut off creditor's rights against a husband because a wife's rights
were not subject to her husband's debts. Kurtz, supra note 8, at 985.
23 Primogeniture made a man's eldest son his sole heir. This reflected a traditional
bias for passing the estate to one's blood heirs. See W. MACDONALD, supra note 7, at 60.
24 The King viewed land as a fund for the support of his armies, and, therefore
regarded dower as a burden upon the land. Because the King coveted land for his ar-
mies, men feared that without dower, the King might take the their land after their
death. I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 10, at 623.
25 Id. at § 5.3, 630. Because of the strong policies which conflicted with dower,
courts and Parliament devised several ways to circumvent dower. Those methods were:
(1) jointures created under the Statute of Uses; (2) trusts; and (3) powers of appoint-
ment, which deprived a wife of dower and yet gave the husband all the advantages of an
estate of inheritance. Id. at 631-32.
26 The similar common law concept of curtesy also was adopted in the United
States. At common law, curtesy gave a husband an interest in his wife's land upon her
death. Curtesy was similar to dower except that (1) courts only awarded curtesy to the
husband if children were born from the marriage, and (2) courts gave the husband a life
estate in all the wife's real property, rather than just one-third. J. DUKEMINIER & S. JO-
HANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 398 (3d ed. 1984). Today, all states have abol-
ished curtesy. Id. Of the states retaining dower, only Michigan and South Carolina have
not extended dower rights to widowers. The Michigan and South Carolina dower stat-
utes may be unconstitutional, however, because the Arkansas Supreme Court held a
similar Arkansas statute violative of the equal protection clause. Stokes v. Stokes, 271
Ark. 300, 613 S.W.2d 372 (1981). However, the Court approved a later statute that was
cast in gender-neutral language. Beck v. Merritt, 280 Ark. 331, 657 S.W.2d 549 (1985).
27 See AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 10, at 631-32. See also infra note 35 for
a list of states that have retained dower in some form, and infra note 46 for a list of state
statutes that abolished dower in favor of elective share statutes.
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this trend. First, common-law dower diminishes the alienability of
land. 28 Buyers hesitate to buy lands that might be subject to a sur-
viving spouse's future dower claim. To remove the threat of dower,
a seller must obtain his wife's formal consent to any sale of land. 29
His wife might not consent for any number of reasons.30 Because a
widow can assert dower at any stage in the chain of title, dower
causes a special hardship for title examiners.3 t Second, as part of a
more general movement to recognize women's rights, most states
have acknowledged that the widow is at least as entitled to a share in
her husband's property as the children, and certainly more so than
the next of kin.32 Finally, because land no longer represents the
principal source of wealth in this country, most states have realized
that protection of the spouse must extend beyond real property to
include personal property. 33
B. Statutory Protection of the Surviving Spouse
In place of common-law dower, states have developed various
devices to protect the surviving spouse from disinheritance by the
decedent. 34 Many states have completely abolished dower, while a
few have refined it.35 Many states that have refined dower have en-
hanced the widow's share from a one-third share in a life estate to a
one-third share in an outright fee. 36 Most of the states retaining
dower have granted coextensive rights to widowers as well. 37 More-
28 See W. MACDONALD, supra note 7, at 61.
29 Id. See also United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in Annapolis, 46 F. Supp. 441,
446 (D. Md. 1942) (Dower may not be defeated by a voluntary conveyance without wife's
consent); Rowe v. Ratcliff, 268 Ky. 217, 219, 104 S.W.2d 437 (1937) (Husband cannot,
by gift, take away wife's inchoate dower rights without her consent).
30 W. MACDONALD, supra note 7, at 60-61.
31 See id. at 62-63.
32 See AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 10, at 632-33.
33 Kurtz, supra note 8, at 989.
34 Dower is irrelevant in the eight community property states (Arizona, California,
Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas and Washington). The community prop-
erty system views marriage as an equal partnership which each spouse contributes to,
whether by working inside or outside the home. Therefore, each spouse owns an undi-
vided one-half interest in the community property. Community property includes earn-
ings by both spouses during marriage. Under this system, a deceased spouse has
testamentary power only over one-half the community property. Conversely, under the
common-law system, all earnings belong to the wage earner if only one spouse works
outside the home.
35 The following states retain dower in some form: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-11-102
(1987); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.211 (West 1964 & Supp. 1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 392.020 (Baldwin 1984); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.221 (Callaghan 1984 & Supp. 1988);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2103.02 (Baldwin 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-5-110 (Law Co-
op. 1976); W. VA. CODE § 43-1-1 (1982 & Supp. 1988).
36 See supra note 35.
37 The rights widowers receive coextensively with widows replace any curtesy rights
widowers had. See supra note 26.
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over, all common-law states have developed various devices to pro-
tect the surviving spouse beyond any dower or forced share rights
he or she may have.3 8 The most common devices used to enhance
protection of the surviving spouse include homestead laws, personal
property set-aside laws, and family allowance laws.
Homestead laws generally give a surviving spouse a right to oc-
cupy the family home for his or her lifetime free of creditor claims.3 9
This right supplements any other rights the surviving spouse has in
the decedent's estate. However, the amount of the exemption from
debt varies dramatically among the states. Some states exempt the
entire home regardless of value,40 while others provide little protec-
tion for the surviving spouse. 4 1
Related to homestead laws are personal property set-aside laws
and family allowance laws. Under personal property set-aside laws,
the surviving spouse has the right to have certain statutorily enu-
merated tangible personal property of the decedent set aside for
her.42 Like homestead, personal property items are exempt from
creditors. Every state has a statute authorizing the probate court to
award an allowance for maintenance and support of the surviving
spouse. 43 The allowance may be for a fixed period, or for the dura-
38 See infra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
39 This type of homestead is often called a "probate homestead." In addition to
exemption from general creditor claims, some states exempt the homestead from prop-
erty tax.
40 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-41-205 (1973); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-41-100
(Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 43-31-15 (1987).
41 Uniform Probate Code section 2-401 recommends a mere $5,000. UNIF. PROB.
CODE § 2-401 (1982). See also ALA. CODE § 43-8-100 (1975) ($6,000); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 28-39-203 (1987) ($2,500); HAw. REV. STAT. § 560:2-401 (1976) ($5,000); IOWA CODE
§ 561.2 (1946 & Supp. 1987) ($500); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 427.060 (Baldwin 1978)
($5,000); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2322 (1979) ($7,500); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-401
(1978) ($6,000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 105 (1975) ($5,000); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-
151.3 (1950) ($5,000); W. VA. CODE § 38-9-1 (1985) ($5,000).
42 These items typically include household furniture and clothing, but may also in-
clude other family items, such as the family car. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 43-8-111 (1982)
(awarding the surviving spouse $3,500 worth of furniture, automobiles, furnishings, ap-
pliances and personal effects beyond the homestead allowance); MINN. STAT. § 525.15(2)
(1984 & Supp. 1988) (surviving spouse entitled to receive one automobile as part of the
allowance).
43 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 43-8-112 (1982); ALASKA STAT. § 13.11.135 (1962 & Supp.
1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-403 (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45-273a (1958 &
Supp. 1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 907(b) (1974); FLA. STAT. § 732.403 (1976);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-403 (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 15-1 (Smith-
Hurd 1978 & Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-4-3 (Burns Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 59-403 (1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-403 (1964); MD. EST. & TRUSTS
CODE ANN. § 3-201 (1974 & Supp. 1987); MAss. GEN. L. ch. 200, § 10 (1981); MINN.
STAT. § 525.15 (1984 & Supp. 1988); Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-7-135 (1973); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 474.260 (1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-803 (1988); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-
2324 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:1 (1974); N.J. REV. STAT. § 3B:3-30 (1983);
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-3.1 (Consol. 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-15
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tion of the administration period.44 The allowance, like homestead
and personal property set-aside, exists independently of whatever
other rights the surviving spouse may have.
Because of the inadequacies of common-law dower,45 the vast
majority of states have replaced it with forced share statutes.46 Typ-
ically, forced share statutes allow a surviving spouse to take a fixed
share, usually one-third or one-half47 of the decedent's probate es-
tate,48 whether the decedent dies testate or intestate. In most
cases, 49 the forced share statutes provide the surviving spouse with
greater protection against disinheritance than that provided by com-
mon-law dower because under a forced share regime the surviving
spouse takes a share of the decedent's entire probate estate, which
(1984); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-07-02 (1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 114.015 (1983); 20 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2110 (Purdon 1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-10-3 (1984); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 62-2-401 (Law. Co-op 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 30-20-20 (1984); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 30-2-102 (1984 & Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-403 (1978); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 404 (1974 & Supp. 1988); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-151.1 (1987); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 861.31 (West 1971 & Supp. 1987); Wyo. STAT. § 2-5-103 (1977).
44 Kurtz, supra note 8, at 990.
45 See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
46 The following states have abolished dower in favor of elective share statutes:
A[A. CODE § 43-8-70 (1982); ALASKA STAT. § 13.11.070 (1962 & Supp. 1985); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 15-11-201 (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45-273a (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
12, § 901 (1974); FLA. STAT. § 732.201 (1976); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-201 (1985); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 15-1 (Smith-Hurd 1978); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-3-1
(Burns 1972); KAN. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59-2233 (Vernon 1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
18-A, § 2-201 (1964); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 3-203 (1974); MASS. GEN. L. ch.
191, § 15 (1981); MINN. STAT. § 525.2-212 (1984); Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-5-25 (1973);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 474.160 (1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-702 (1988); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 30-2313 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:10 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:8-1
(West 1983); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1 (Consol. 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 30.1 (1984); N.D. CEr. CODE § 30.1-05-01 (1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 114.105 (1983);
20 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 2203 (Purdon 1975 & supp. 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-6-22
(1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-201 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 30-
5A-1 (1984); TENN CODE ANN. § 31-4-101 (1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-201 (1978);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 402 (1974); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-13 (1987); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 861.02 (West 1971 & Supp. 1987); Wyo. STAT. § 2-5-101 (1977).
47 The exact amount of the surviving spouse's fixed share often is calculated by
what the share would be under the state's intestacy statute. Thus, her share will vary
depending upon whether the decedent left issue and/or kin. See J. DUKEMINIER & S.
JOHANSON, supra note 26, at 400. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-201 (1976).
48 The probate estate is composed of all assets the decedent owned at death that
pass by will or inheritance and which the decedent's personal representative can admin-
ister. Because the statute of wills does not cover property passing at death by contract:
(1) property held in ajoint tenancy; (2) property held in trust; and (3) property in which
the decedent holds a power of appointment, these forms of property are not probate
assets. See T. ATKINSON, ATKINSON ON WILLS § 44, at 193 (2d ed. 1953).
49 In cases where the husband had held large amounts of real property during his
lifetime, but had sold most of it and consumed most of the proceeds by his death, a
widow would be better off under common-law dower than under a forced share statute
because under the latter she is unable to reach land which her husband owned during
marriage once it is sold.
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includes both real and personal property. The policy underlying
forced share statutes is similar to that underlying community prop-
erty laws: the spouse's protection flows from the nature of the mari-
tal property. 50 This reflects the notion that both spouses contribute
to the financial assets after marriage. It naturally follows that the
surviving spouse receives a forced share of the decedent's probate
estate in fee simple regardless of the surviving spouse's actual
need.5'I i
Forced share statutes, however, do not prevent a decedent from
disinheriting a surviving spouse because the probate estate does not
include assets which the decedent transfers inter vivos. A person
who wishes to disinherit his spouse need only transfer his property
before death. Two of the most common lifetime transfers used to
disinherit spouses are revocable inter vivos trusts and joint bank ac-
counts.5 2 These devices are attractive to disinheritors because
although the disinheritor transfers an inter vivos legal interest, the
disinheritor is in effect the real owner until death. For example, in
one common type of revocable inter vivos trust, a Totten trust,5 3 the
owner names himself trustee for the beneficiary, but retains lifetime
dominion and the power to revoke. 54 The owner receives all the
proceeds of the trust during his lifetime, and can revoke the benefi-
ciary's interest at anytime up to his own death. A revocable trust
therefore resembles a will in two respects: it is revocable until
death, and "the interests of the devisees are ambulatory-that is,
nonexistent until the testator's death". 55
Similarly, a disinheritor can use a joint bank account to disin-
herit his surviving spouse. In theory, the donee in a joint bank ac-
50 See Kurtz, supra note 8, at 990.
51 Under all forced share statutory schemes the surviving spouse is entitled to a
share in the decedent's probate estate even though the surviving spouse may be a sub-
stantial wage earner, or may have significant wealth of her own through inheritance from
a parent. Kurtz, supra note 8, at 991; see also W. MACDONALD, supra note 7, at 290-91
(Advocating adoption of a maintenance system patterned after England's in which a
court may award maintenance payments to a surviving spouse and children if it deter-
mines that the decedent did not make adequate provisions for them.).
52 W. MACDONALD, supra note 7, at 4.
53 See In re Estate of Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904). The Totten trust
has been approved by the Restatement and is described as follows:
Where a person makes a deposit in a savings account in a bank or other
savings organization in his own name as trustee for another person in-
tending to reserve a power to withdraw the whole or any part of the de-
posit at any time during his lifetime and to use as his own whatever he
may withdraw, or otherwise to revoke the trust, the intended trust is en-
forceable by the beneficiary upon the death of the depositor as to any
part remaining on deposit on his death if he has not revoked the trust.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58 (1959).
54 Langbein, supra note 6, at 1113.
55 Id. at 1110.
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count receives an interest equal to the donor's, and the donor loses
the power to revoke the transfer.56 In practice, however, because of
the privilege of mutual withdrawal, either cotenant can empty the
entire account. Therefore, a depositor may name a cotenant on a
bank account but treat the account as his own. 57 The cotenant may
not even know that the account exists. Moreover, some bank ac-
count agreements permit the depositor to revoke and alter coten-
ancy designations freely. 58 The depositor also may close the
account, withdraw the funds, and open a new account in his name
only.59 In this manner, joint bank accounts, like revocable inter
vivos trusts, operate as wills yet are not subject to the spouse's
forced share. Thus, if the decedent removes all assets from the pro-
bate estate through lifetime transfers, the surviving spouse may be
left with a statutory share of nothing.
C. Judicial Protection of the Surviving Spouse
Because persons wishing to disinherit their spouses could easily
evade forced share statutes by using lifetime transfers, courts have
created three primary tests by which the surviving spouse might de-
feat a lifetime transfer by the decedent and return the assets to the
probate estate. First is the illusory transfer test.60 Under this test a
court will set aside an inter vivos transfer if the decedent retained
excessive control over, or an interest in, the transferred property.
The leading case defining the illusory transfer doctrine is New-
man v. Dore.6 1 In Newman, Ferdinand Straus, a deceased octogena-
rian, and his thirty-year old wife were married four years before his
death. The decedent became unhappy with the marriage. Three
days before his death, the decedent executed an inter vivos trust
consisting of all his real and personal property for the benefit of
himself and his children from a prior marriage. The terms of the
trust gave the decedent the right to income for life, the power to
revoke the trust, and substantial managerial powers. 62 The dece-
dent's widow challenged the validity of the trust. The court held
that the trust was illusory because the decedent had retained exces-
56 Id. at 1112.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 This test grew out of the more rigid testamentary transfer test. Courts used the
test to void lifetime transfers that were to take effect at death. Courts at this time were
concerned with protecting the statute of wills, and did so rigidly. See, e.g., Fleming v.
Fleming, 194 Iowa 122, 184 N.W. 296 (1921) (outright transfer under a business agree-
ment); Merz v. Tower Grove Bank & Trust Co., 344 Mo. 1150, 130 S.W.2d 611 (1939)
(revocable trust); Hill's Estate, 15 Pa. D. & C. 699 (1931) (declaration of trust).
6 1 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937).
62 Id. at 380, 9 N.E. 2d at 969.
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sive control over the trust property. Therefore, the court concluded
that the trust property was part of the probate estate. 63 The ques-
tion under the illusory transfer test is whether or not the transferor
had in good faith 64 divested himself of the ownership of his prop-
erty, or whether the transferor retained too much control over the
transferred property.
Although relatively predictable, 65 courts and commentators
have criticized the illusory trust test for: (1) undervaluing the im-
portance of retained revocation power; (2) causing courts to ignore
the test when equities cut the other way; and (3) being too narrow. 66
These criticisms all rest on the fact that the test focuses on the de-
gree of retained control by the transferor to the exclusion of all
other considerations.
The second test courts use to void inter vivos transfers is the
intent test.6 7 Under this test, a court will set aside an inter vivos
transfer if it finds that the decedent intended to defraud the surviv-
ing spouse of a statutory forced share. The court in SherriU v. Mal-
licote68 employed the intent test to set aside an irrevocable trust of
securities. The trust gave the decedent income for life, and named
his siblings as trustees and remaindermen. The record indicated a
long history of severe marital problems between the surviving
spouse and the decedent and his family.69
In holding that the decedent had established the trust intending
to defeat the spouse's statutory share, the appellate court found the
following facts relevant: the size of the transfer and whether it was
made for consideration, the proximity of the transfer to the dece-
dent's death, relations between the spouses at the time of the trans-
fer, and the source of the decedent's wealth. 70 The court further
held that proof of an intent to defeat the surviving spouse's share is
not always dispositive because the decedent may have intended to
63 Id. at 381, 9 N.E. 2d at 969-70.
64 The court defined good faith as the transferor's intent to divest himself of the
ownership of his property, not his intent concerning his wife's statutory share. Id. at
379, 9 N.E.2d at 969, citing Benkart v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 269 Pa. 257, 259, 112
A. 62, 63 (1920).
65 See W. MAcDONALD, supra note 7, at 89.
66 Id. at 87-92.
67 Merz v. Tower Grove Bank & Trust Co., 344 Mo. 1150, 130 S.W.2d 611 (1939)
(court inferred a fraudulent intent from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the
case); Patch v. Squires, 105 Vt. 405, 165 A. 919 (1933) (court held that a surviving
spouse cannot defeat an inter vivos transfer absent a showing of actual intent to defraud
his or her elective share as distinguished from a presumed intent that could be inferred
by circumstantial evidence that the decedent intended to defraud the surviving spouse).
68 57 Tenn. App. 241, 417 S.W.2d 798 (1967), superseded by statute, as noted in Har-
ren v. Compton, 626 S.W.2d 12 (Tenn. App. 1981).
69 Id. at 244-45, 417 S.W.2d at 800.
70 Id. at 248, 417 S.W.2d at 802.
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defeat the surviving spouse's share because he had already provided
for her.71 Under the Sherril court's interpretation of the intent test,
courts should consider the actual effect of the transfer. Some
courts, however, ignore the practical effect of a transfer once they
find that the decedent intended to defeat the surviving spouse's
share.72 In addition to the uncertainty over the distinction between
motive (incentive) and intent (specific purpose), the intent test is
highly unpredictable because it depends upon a close examination
of the particular facts of each case.73
The third major test courts use to determine the validity of inter
vivos transfers is the reality test. Under the reality test, courts up-
hold an inter vivos transfer if it is valid, regardless of the rights of
the surviving spouse. The surviving spouse can, therefore, only
challenge a transfer on the grounds that it is purely fictional or
testamentary.74
The leading case employing the reality test is In re Halpern.75
The decedent in Halpern established four Totten trusts naming his
granddaughter as beneficiary. The surviving spouse sued to have
the trust assets placed in the probate estate. The New York State
Court of Appeals upheld the trusts, declaring that "[t]here is noth-
ing illusory about a Totten trust as such." 76 The court did not de-
fine "illusory" in terms of control, because under a pure control test
a Totten trust would be set aside.77 Instead, the court defined an
"illusory" transfer as one lacking reality for any purpose. 78 The re-
ality test provides the surviving spouse with little protection against
disinheritance because the spouse cannot reach transfers that are
effective under the law of gifts.
The tests courts use to determine the validity of inter vivos
transfers alternatively lack predictability and breadth, and fail to
protect the surviving spouse from disinheritance. The decisions
under these tests often rely on an "ad-hoc balancing of equities,
71 Id., 417 S.W.2d at 802-03.
72 See, e.g., Cherniak v. Home Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 151 Conn. 367, 369-71, 198
A.2d 58, 59-60 (1964) (holding that although the decedent's trust, which gave most of
his assets to his brothers and their children, was tantamount to an expression of the
decedent's intent to limit his wife's statutory share, she had no claim of fraud).
73 Kurtz, supra note 8, at 1000.
74 W. MAcDONALD, supra note 7, at 120.
75 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E.2d 120 (1951), superseded by statute as stated in Estate of
Agioritis, 52 A.D.2d 128, 383 N.Y.S.2d 304 (1976), aff'd, 40 N.Y.2d 646, 357 N.E.2d
979, 389 N.Y.S.2d 323.
76 Id. at 38, 100 N.E.2d at 122 (1951). But see Montgomery v. Michaels, 54 Ill. 2d
532, 537, 301 N.E.2d 465, 468 (1973), superseded by statute as stated in Clay v. Woods, 39
Ill. App. 3d 711, 487 N.E.2d 1106 (1985) (held that Totten trusts clearly are illusory).
77 Kurtz, supra note 8, at 1003.
78 Halpern, 303 N.Y. at 38, 100 N.E. 2d at 122.
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based upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case." 79
By ruling according to the equities in particular cases, courts tend to
distort the tests from their original form because the equitable re-
sult may differ from the result the court would reach if it applied the
test strictly.80
D. The Augmented Estate Under the Uniform Probate Code
In response to legislative inaction and judicial uncertainties
concerning inter vivos transfers under forced share statutes, the
U.P.C. developed the augmented estate concept to define precisely
which assets are subject to the surviving spouse's elective share.8'
The augmented estate enhances the protection of the surviving
spouse by specifically including any transfer whereby the transferor
retained any of the following incidents of ownership: "possession
or enjoyment of, or right to income from, the property; ... power
* . . to revoke or to consume, invade or dispose of the principal for
his own benefit." 82 Because both revocable trusts and retained life
estates meet these criteria, such inter vivos transfers are subject- to
the surviving spouse's elective share.
Also included in the decedent's augmented estate is any prop-
erty "held at the time of death by the decedent and another with a
right of survivorship." 8 3 This provision brings any joint tenancy
within the augmented estate. This provision and the provision cov-
ering transfers where the transferor retains incidents of ownership
eliminate two of the most prevalent means used by spouses to cir-
cumvent forced share statutes. The Code contains the two provi-
sions because the Commissioners recognized that will substitutes
allow a person to enjoy continued benefit or control over his prop-
erty while making arrangements to disinherit his spouse should she
survive him. 84 In order to understand better why the Commission-
ers created the two provisions, it is necessary to compare the func-
tions of will substitutes with the functions of wills.
79 Kurtz, supra note 8, at 1006.
80 Id. at 994.
81 See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text. Eleven states have adopted elective
share provisions similar to U.P.C. § 2-202; Ai~sKA STAT. §§ 13.11.070 - 13.11.100
(1985); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-11-201 - 15-17-207 (1987); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 560:2-
201 - 560:2-207 (1976 & Supp. 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 2-201 - 2-207
(1964 & Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. §§ 524.2-201 - 524.2-207 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 72-2-702 - 72-2-707 (1987); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-2313 - 30-2319 (1985); N.J. REV.
STAT. §§ 3B:8-1 - 3B:8-19 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 30.1-05-01 - 30.1-05-07 (1976 &
Supp. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 30-5A-1 - 30-5A-8 (1984); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 75-2-201 - 75-2-207 (1953 & Supp. 1988).
82 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-202(1) (1982). See supra note 2 for full text.
83 Id.
84 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-202 commentary at 39 (1982).
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II
WILL SUBSTITUTES
A. Will Substitutes as Wealth Transmitting Devices
Estate planners increasingly have resorted to nonprobate meth-
ods of transferring wealth upon death in order to avoid the costs of
probate, such as court costs, delays, and publicity.85 One can divide
the nonprobate system into four primary will substitutes: life insur-
ance, pension accounts, joint accounts, and revocable trusts.8 6
These will substitutes are inexpensive and readily available to the
public. Financial intermediaries market them using standard form
instruments with fill-in-the-blank beneficiary designations.8 7 These
substitutes can perform the same functions as a will. Like wills, they
are revocable until death, and the interest of the devisee therefore is
nonexistent until death.88
Notwithstanding the functional similarities between wills and
will substitutes, our legal system often has ignored the will-like
character of will substitutes, resulting in distorted legal doctrine.8 9
To the extent that the U.P.C. elective share provision captures cer-
tain lifetime transfers within the augmented estate, it serves to elimi-
nate these distortions. The Commissioners explicitly adopted a
policy against transfers "deliberately [designed] to defeat the right
of the surviving spouse to a share [of the decedent's estate] .... "90
The capture provisions of U.P.C. § 2-202 are consistent with this
policy against disinheritance because they include in the augmented
estate two of the most common methods by which persons have dis-
inherited their spouses. By failing to include life insurance in the
augmented estate, however, the Commissioners did not carry this
policy to its logical conclusion.
B. The Will-like Nature of Life Insurance
Like other will substitutes, life insurance possesses the two ele-
ments of a will-it is revocable until death,9 1 and the interests of the
devisees are ambulatory. 92 In fact, life insurance is "functionally in-
85 See N. DACEY, How TO AVOID PROBATE (1965).
86 Langbein, supra note 6, at 1109.
87 Id.
88 Id. at I110.
89 See supra notes 55-80 and accompanying text.
90 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-202 commentary at 39 (1982).
91 Life insurance contracts rarely create an irrevocable beneficiary designation. See
J. GREIDER & W. BEADLES, LAW AND THE LIFE INSURANCE CONTRACT 145 (3d ed. 1974).
See also bifra note 122.
92 Langbein, supra note 6, at 1110.
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distinguishable from a will." 93 The different treatment accorded
wills and life insurance policies results from the fact that life insur-
ance derives its validity from contract law, while wills derive their
validity from the law of wills. Because of its contractual nature,
courts consistently have held life insurance to be unrelated to hus-
band-wife relationships. 94 Courts variously have defined the benefi-
ciary's right under a life insurance policy to be vested, subject to
divestment, 9 5 an inchoate right,9 6 and, in the majority of cases, a
mere expectancy interest.9 7 This is precisely the same type of char-
acterization courts use to define a beneficiary's right under a will.98
In reality, then, the assets of a life insurance policy belong to the
policy holder during his lifetime, just as assets under a will belong to
the testator until his death.
The U.P.C. advances another rationale for treating life insur-
ance assets differently from probate assets. The Code states that life
insurance assets are more like estate builders than estate
depletors.9 9 While undoubtedly true in most cases, life insurance
serves as an effective disinheriting device in some cases.' 00 Life in-
surance serves this purpose if the insurance proceeds comprise a
large portion of the decedent's assets. In such a case, the decedent
can disinherit his spouse merely by changing the beneficiary
designation under the policy to someone other than the spouse.
Moreover, even if the decedent does not have life insurance assets,
he can disinherit his spouse by purchasing a substantial single pre-
93 Id.
94 Jenkins v. Lovelady, 290 Ala. 25, 273 So. 2d 189 (1973); Hollaway v. Selvidge,
219 Kan. 345, 548 P.2d 835 (1976); Redd v. Brooke, 96 Nev. 9, 604 P.2d 360 (1980);
Hergenrather v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co., 79 Ohio App. 116, 68 N.E.2d 833 (1946);
Washington v. Hicks, 109 Wis. 2d 10, 325 N.W.2d 68 (1982). See also 4 G. COUCH,
CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 27:112, at 777 (2d ed. 1984).
95 See, e.g., Johnson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 56 Colo. 178, 138 P. 414 (1913);
Indiana Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, 180 Ind. 9, 101 N.E. 289 (1913); Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Woolf, 138 N.J. Eq. 450, 47 A.2d 340 (1946); John Hancock Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Heidrick, 135 N.J. Eq. 326, 38 A.2d 442 (1944).
96 See, e.g., Gurnett v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 356 II. 612, 191 N.E. 250 (1934).
97 See, e.g., Thorp v. Randazzo, 41 Cal. 2d 770, 264 P.2d 38 (1953) (en banc); Shaw
v. Board of Admin., 109 Cal. App. 2d 770, 241 P.2d 635 (1952); McEwin v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 42 Cal. App. 133, 183 P. 373 (1919); Hicks v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 166 Iowa 532, 147 N.W. 883 (1914); Life Ins. Co. of North America v.Jackson, 475
A.2d 1150 (Me. 1984).
98 See Langbein, supra note 6, at 1128. See also, Moore v. Lindsey, 662 F.2d 354, 359
(5th Cir. 198 1) (characterizing a devisee's legally protected interest in devised property,
depending on the context, as an "inchoate title"); Nelson v. Nelson, 31 Colo. App. 63,
66, 497 P.2d 1284, 1286 (1972) (characterizing a named beneficiary's interest under a
will as a "mere expectanc[y]").
99 See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-202 commentary at 40 (1982) (life insurance is "not
ordinarily purchased as a way of depleting the probate estate and avoiding the elective
share of the spouse").
100 See infra notes 105-11 and accompanying text.
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mium life insurance policy in favor of donees other than his
spouse.' 0 t In order to protect fully the surviving spouse from disin-
heritance, life insurance assets must be included in the augmented
estate.' 0
2
In other contexts, courts and legislatures have recognized the
functional similarities of wills and life insurance policies and have
accorded them the same treatment. Courts now categorize life in-
surance as a substantial asset in property divisions resulting from
divorce. For example, recent decisions have awarded insurance
benefits to the non-purchasing spouse as part of a property settle-
ment, child support, or alimony decree. 10 3 In addition, the Internal
Revenue Code acknowledges the will-like quality of life insurance by
including the life insurance assets payable to third parties in the de-
cedent's gross estate. 10 4 These examples demonstrate that insur-
ance assets, like probate assets, are in fact assets of the insured's.
They are not the beneficiary's assets because the insured retains the
power to eliminate completely the beneficiary's interest.
C. Life Insurance as a Disinheriting Device
Caselaw supports the contention that a decedent can use life
insurance effectively to disinherit his surviving spouse. The dece-
dent in Mitchell v. Mitchell '0 5 changed the beneficiary rights on his
insurance policies from his estate to his mother shortly after sepa-
rating from his wife. Thereafter, the decedent and his wife recon-
ciled, with the decedent assuring his wife that he had not changed
the beneficiary designation. The trial court invalidated the transfers
as illusory and a fraud on the wife. The court compared the life
insurance to a Totten trust, stating that when the insured can
change beneficiaries, the rights of those beneficiaries "are contin-
gent and revocable; they do not vest until the death of the assured
or settlor."106
101 Kurtz, supra note 8, at 1035.
102 Including life insurance in the augmented estate also would prevent the surviv-
ing spouse from being unjustly enriched at the expense of other beneficiaries under the
decedent's will. This occurs where the decedent already adequately has provided for the
surviving spouse in a life insurance policy, but the spouse elects to take a statutory share.
The spouse therefore receives the life insurance assets plus one-third of the probate
assets.
103 See, e.g., Teaffv. Ritchey, 622 S.W.2d 589, 592 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (residue or
community property including the life insurance policies on husband's life passed to
wife); see also Note, Whose Life (Insurance) is it Anyway? Life Insurance and Divorce in America,
22J. FAM. L. 95, 95-96 (1983) (authored by Mark Richardson Brown) (discussing use of
insurance policy as a means of child support, and as part of a property settlement).
104 I.R.C. § 2042(2) (1982).
105 177 Misc. 1050, 32 N.Y.S.2d 839 (Sup. Ct. 1942), rev'd, 265 A.D. 27, 37 N.Y.S.2d
612 (1942), aff'd without opinion, 290 N.Y. 779, 50 N.E.2d 106 (1943).
106 Id. at 1050, 1052, 32 N.Y.S.2d at 842.
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The appellate court reversed, finding nothing illusory about the
change in beneficiaries. The court further stated that the insured
had an "absolute right"'10 7 to change beneficiaries under his insur-
ance contract. The court also stressed the reasonableness of the
transaction given the fact that the decedent left the surviving spouse
a sizeable net estate.108
In Estate of Brown,10 9 however, the surviving spouse successfully
argued that the decedent's life insurance policy was testamentary in
character and subject to her elective share. The decedent had set up
an unfunded insurance trust which allowed the decedent to revoke
the beneficiaries, to receive income and benefits from the policies,
and to withdraw the policies from the trust agreement. The dece-
dent named his minor son as beneficiary under the trust agreement,
and the widow chose to take against the decedent's will. The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court held that because the decedent had re-
tained lifetime control over the insurance trust, the trust was
testamentary in nature.110 Accordingly, the court, awarded the
widow one-half of the cash surrender value of the insurance policy
as part of her elective share."'I
Most of the cases questioning the immunity of life insurance
from the surviving spouse's elective share 12 arose when life insur-
ance played a relatively small role in the wealth transmission pro-
cess."13 Today, however, life insurance has emerged as one of the
most significant modes of wealth transmission." 14 In fact, some
commentators view life insurance today as a testament more impor-
tant than the will,"15 and the "life insurance beneficiary designation
107 Id. at 30, 37 N.Y.S.2d at 615.
108 Id. at 33, 37, N.Y.S.2d at 617. See also Bullen v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 177
Md. 271, 9 A.2d 581 (1939) (holding that a revocable trust involving a substantial
amount of life insurance was not subject to the surviving spouse's interest merely be-
cause the decedent retained complete control over it).
109 384 Pa. 99, 119 A.2d 513 (1956).
1nO Id. at99, 119A.2d at 515.
111 Id., 119 A.2d at 517.
112 See supra notes 105-11 and accompanying text; see also Weisman v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 7 N.Y.S.2d 565 (Sup. Ct. 1938), aff'd without opinion, 256 A.D. 914, 10
N.Y.S.2d 414 (1939) (surviving spouse prevailing where the decedent assigned his life
insurance policies to another after promising to make the surviving spouse the benefici-
ary); Reiss v. Reiss, 166 Misc. 274, 2 N.Y.S.2d 358 (Sup. Ct. 1937) (ruling in widow's
favor when the husband had changed beneficiaries in violation of a settlement
agreement).
113 In 1950, purchases of life insurance were just below 30 billion dollars. In 1985
purchases of life insurance exceeded 1.6 trillion dollars. AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE
INSURANCE, 1986 LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 14 (1986).
114 Kimball, The Functions of Designations of Beneficiaries in AModern Life Insurance: U.S.A.,
in LIFE INSURANCE LAW in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 74, 76 UJ. Hellner & G. Nord eds.
1969).
115 Id.
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[as] the principal 'last will and testament' of our legal system."116 In
1985, purchases of life insurance exceeded $1.6 trillion dollars." 17
This represents a nine-fold increase over purchases of life insurance
in 1965.118 In 1985, 85% of American families owned life insur-
ance, in an average amount of $74,600.119 Life insurance is appeal-
ing because it avoids probate CoStS,12 0 shelters the insured from
income taxes during his life, provides an immediate source of funds
to meet taxes and expenses of the estate upon death, keeps the in-
surance proceeds out of the insured's estate, and avoids estate
taxes. 121 The rapid growth in the use of life insurance greatly in-
creases the possibility that persons will use life insurance effectively
to disinherit their surviving spouse's.
III
PROPOSALS
By excluding life insurance assets from the surviving spouse's
forced share, states leave open a significant loophole for anyone
wishing to disinherit his or her spouse. Because life insurance al-
lows the insured to revoke the policy at any time prior to his death,
it is an attractive disinheriting device. Life insurance is even more
attractive under the U.P.C. augmented estate concept because the
augmented estate excludes life insurance while including all other
lifetime transfers where the transferor retains power to revoke the
transfer or to control the assets during his lifetime. To provide uni-
formity of law and to protect the well-settled public policy of
preventing decedents from disinheriting surviving spouses, states
should permit surviving spouses to reach life insurance assets with
their forced share.
A. Include Life Insurance Assets in the Augmented Estate
Accordingly, states should pass elective share statutes that in-
clude revocable life insurance assets in the augmented estate be-
cause, like probate assets, they belong to the insured. The
insurance assets belong to the insured rather than the beneficiary
116 Id.
117 See supra note 113.
118 AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE, 1986 LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 6
(1986).
119 Id.
120 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
121 D. WESTFALL, ESTATE PLANNING LAW AND TAXATION 5-1 (1984). Life insurance
shelters the insured from income taxes during his lifetime because he does not pay in-
come taxes on the amount of the policy. Moreover, life insurance proceeds are contrac-
tual, and therefore not considered part of the decedent's estate. Thus, life insurance
funds do not go through probate and immediately are available to the named
beneficiary.
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because the insured usually retains an absolute power to revoke the
beneficiary's interest in the assets.' 22 Only by including insurance
assets in the augmented estate can courts protect surviving spouses
from this method of disinheritance. Such a statute would com-
pletely protect the surviving spouse because the spouse's statutory
share would encompass all assets owned and controlled by the dece-
dent. This statute would produce rational consistency in statutory
share provisions, and would foster the well-settled public policy of
protecting the surviving spouse. 23
Even without action by state legislatures, courts should aban-
don the functional distinction between wills and life insurance. It is
unrealistic to characterize life insurance as anything other than an
asset of the insured.' 24 The insured retains the same rights over
insurance assets as a testator retains over will assets-namely, the
power to revoke the transfer at any time up to death. Because the
insured retains an absolute right to revoke the beneficiary's interest
in the life insurance policy, that interest, like the beneficiary's inter-
est under a will, is ambulatory. Because of the functional similarities
between life insurance assets and probate assets, a legal rule that
distinguishes between the two is unrealistic with current reality.
Courts therefore should exercise their function of common law for-
mulation and create a more consistent rule.
122 Irrevocable life insurance beneficiary designations are used infrequently today.
J. GREIDER & W. BEADLES, supra note 91, at 145. The only time a person wishing to
disinherit his spouse would use an irrevocable life insurance policy would be just prior
to his death because the beneficiary's right under the policy is vested. Once vested, the
insured cannot reduce or destroy the beneficiary's right. Id. However, the augmented
estate thwarts such disinheriting plans by capturing any irrevocable transfer made by the
decedent within two years of the decedent's death. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-202 (1)(iv)
(1982). After capturing this transfer, it remains unclear how courts should calculate the
worth of the irrevocable policy. Courts either could value the life insurance at the time
of the transfer, or at the time the insured dies and the beneficiary is to receive the policy
proceeds. The U.P.C. states that courts should value irrevocable inter vivos transfers of
property "as of the date the donee came into possession or enjoyment if that occurs
first," rather than valuing the policy upon the decedent's death. Id. § 2-202 (1). Valuing
an irrevocable life insurance policy when the donee's interest vests is sensible because
the policy becomes valuable to the donee at that time. The donee can take out a loan
against the policy or assign the policy for consideration. Because the beneficiary's inter-
est in an irrevocable life insurance policy is valuable when the insured creates the policy,
states should follow the general rule of valuation of irrevocable transfers enunciated in
the U.P.C. and explicitly state in the statute that if the decedent creates an irrevocable
life insurance policy within two years of his death, it is to be valued as of the date the
insured designates the beneficiary.
123 See Comment, Probate Reform: The New Minnesota Elective Share Statutes, 70 MINN. L.
REV. 241, 258 (1985) (arguing for reform of Minnesota's elective share statute to include
all insurance benefits payable upon the decedent's death within the augmented estate).
124 See Note, Applying the Doctrine of Revocation by Divorce to Life Insurance Policies, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 653, 694 (1988) (authored by Alan S. Wilmit) (arguing that revocation-
by-divorce statutes should treat life insurance policy assets like assets transferred under
a will because life insurance is a will substitute).
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B. Protecting Insurance Companies from Wrongful
Disbursement Liability
In implementing a rule which treats insurance policies and wills
as functional equivalents, courts must guard against the insurance
company's potential liability for wrongful disbursement. Wrongful
disbursement may occur because of the insurance company's con-
tractual obligation to pay a certain amount of money upon the in-
sured's death to whomever the insured designates.125 If an
insurance company fulfills its obligations by paying a named benefi-
ciary who is not the decedent's spouse, and a court later holds that
the insurance proceeds should have gone to the augmented estate,
the surviving spouse may sue for wrongful disbursement. Courts
can protect insurance companies from such liability in several ways.
1. Interpleader
Interpleader permits any party possessing property to which it
does not claim title to submit to a court the question of who right-
fully owns the property if at least two other parties claim title to the
property. 26 This is precisely the position of the insurance company
if an insured names a third party as beneficiary under this policy and
the insured's spouse claims the insurance as part of his or her elec-
tive share. Upon the death of the insured, the insurance proceeds
belong to someone other than the insurance company, but the com-
pany may be unsure as to whom it should pay. In such a situation,
the insurance company could file a bill of interpleader, deposit the
money with the court, and let the court decide among the
claimants. 127
The costs of interpleader to the insurance company are rela-
tively low considering that interpleader settles the entire question in
one court proceeding rather than the several that might be required
if each claimant brought a separate suit.' 28 Moreover, the expenses
an insurance company incurs in an interpleader action generally are
deductible by the company in whole or in part from the proceeds of
the policy. 129 Thus, interpleader would protect insurance compa-
125 See, e.g., Case Comment, Life Ihsurance-Divorce Property Settlements-Relative Rights
of Beneficiaries-New Jersey's Inflible Approach, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 189, 198 (1970).
126 J. Greider & W. Beadles, supra note 91, at 495.
127 Id. See also, Cassiday v. Cassiday, 256 Md. 5, 259 A.2d 299 (1969) (Use of inter-
pleader by life insurance company where the policy named the decedent's divorced wife
as beneficiary, and the decedent's second wife claimed he intended to assign the insur-
ance to her); Nixon v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 124 A.2d 305 (D.C. Mup. App. 1956) (Use of
interpleader by life insurance company where decedent's life insurance policies failed to
designate a beneficiary).
128 J. GREIDER & W. BEADLES, supra note 91, at 495.
129 Id. at 496. Life insurance companies also may fear the delay caused by inter-
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nies from double liability and would avoid multiple litigation at a
relatively low cost.
2. Notice to File for an Elective Share
Another way courts can protect insurance companies from
wrongful disbursement liability is to relieve them from liability for
benefits wrongly paid to the named beneficiary unless the surviving
spouse gives notice of an intention to file for an elective share. Re-
quiring such notice is sensible because where the surviving spouse
has given notice, a controversy over the life insurance assets is likely
if the other assets do not satisfy the spouse's forced share.
In order to avoid burdening the named beneficiary with undue
delay in collecting the proceeds of the policy, courts should require
the spouse to give notice within a reasonable time of the
decendent's death. Absent such notice, the insurer would not be
liable merely for fulfilling its contractual obligation of paying the
named beneficiary. 130 If the insurer were to wrongfully pay the
named beneficiary, restitution law would make the recipient dis-
gorge the payment to the intended beneficiary.' 3 '
CONCLUSION
For centuries, both in the United States and in England, courts
have protected surviving spouses from complete disinheritance by
their deceased spouses. The basis for this protection is both a con-
cern that surviving spouses be supported adequately, and an idea
that surviving spouses contribute to the marriage and therefore de-
serve a share of the marital property upon the marriage's dissolu-
tion. The public policy of protecting the surviving spouse is so
important that it supercedes the strong competing public policy
favoring freedom of alienation. In fact, every state protects a surviv-
ing spouse from disinheritance in some manner.
Because of the strong public policy concerns favoring the sur-
viving spouse, the U.P.C. explicitly adopts a position against disin-
heritance. The Commissioners sought to prevent disinheritance
altogether by developing the augmented estate concept. While the
augmented estate captures transfers in which the decedent retained
pleader. However, this is a small price to pay for uniformity. Moreover, where inter-
pleader prevents multiple -litigation, it reduces delay.
130 S. 291, 74th Leg., 1985 Sess., Minn. (proposed statute that would have included
life insurance in the augmented estate and protected the insurer from liability by requir-
ing the surviving spouse to give notice of an intention to file for an elective share).
131 See Restatement of Restitution § 204 (1937); see also Langbein, supra note 6, at
1139.
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a lifetime interest or a right to revoke the transfer, it neglects to
capture life insurance proceeds.
The failure to include life insurance in the augmented estate
reflects the traditional notion that insurance is within the ambit of
contract law rather than the law of wills. Courts use this distinction
to justify treating life insurance assets differently from probate as-
sets. This view ignores the true nature of life insurance. Like pro-
bate assets, life insurance assets remain under the control of the
decedent until his death. Courts and state legislatures should now
realize that wills and life insurance perform the same functions. Be-
cause wills and life insurance policies function alike, the law should
treat these assets the same by allowing the surviving spouse to reach
life insurance assets to satisfy the forced share.
G. Michael Bridge
